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Italy1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The performance of regulated public utilities has raised concern about how
to reconcile consumers’ protection and the incentive to invest. A popular so-
lution among regulators is the (by now traditional1) RPI −x scheme, which
is supposed to provide the regulated ﬁrm appropriate incentives to invest,
making the regulated price insensitive to cost-reducing investments: in this
way, ﬁrms which reduce their costs are not penalized. However, sometimes
this rule allows the ﬁrm to keep huge proﬁts, and this has lead to propos-
als to force ﬁrms to share their “excess” proﬁt with the consumers (among
others, Sappington and Weisman, 1996; Burns, Turvey and Weyman Jones,
1998). As documented for instance by Sappington (2002) there are now many
cases where price cap regulation is modiﬁed with an earnings sharing clause,
whereby if proﬁts are too high there is an automatic mechanism which riveses
prices, to the beneﬁt of consumers. But - although the evidence is mixed -
the blanket seems to be too short: a redistribution of beneﬁts from the ﬁrms
to the consumers may decrease the incentive to invest2.
This paper analyses and assesses the above concern, in order to under-
stand whether proﬁt sharing schemes actually penalize investment decisions,
relative to a pure price cap. This is done on the basis of modern investment
theory3, which stresses how investment is irreversible, and calls for a set-up
where investment timing and uncertainty play a substantial role. Along these
lines, Panteghini and Scarpa (2003a) use a simple framework to show that
modifying a price cap with an element of proﬁt sharing does not aﬀect the
incentive to make an investment of given amount: the timing and probability
of such an investment are the same, independently of the presence of proﬁt
sharing.
In this paper we consider the - more plausible - set-up where time is
a continuous variable and uncertainty never disappears from the market.
Moreover, and more important, investment size is endogenous:t h eﬁrm can
1According to this scheme, the regulated price should start from a given level, and then
increase at a rate equal to the diﬀerence between the expected inﬂation rate (the Retail
Price Index, RPI) and an exogenously given component (x). See Beesley and Littlechild
(1989).
2On this point, among others, see Mayer and Vickers (1996) and Weisman (2002). See
Ai and Sappington (2002) on the evidence, which lends some (but limited) support to this
fear.
3In particular, we will use the concept real option; see for instance Dixit and Pindyck
(1994).
2make an initial investment and then has the option to expand the plant, so
that total investment size depends on several subsequent decisions. In this
set-up, we can show that the initial investment does not depend on whether
or not the price cap rule has a proﬁt sharing element. The reason is that the
introduction of the proﬁt ceiling into a RPI − x scheme decreases the net
present value of the investment, but also decreases the value of waiting (i.e.,
the option value) by exactly the same amount4.
Proﬁt sharing matters only if the threshold after which proﬁts are passed
on to consumers is low, and in this case we have an underinvestment result.
When the ﬁrm reaches the threshold proﬁt level, beyond which the price cap
b e c o m e st i g h t e ri no r d e rt ot r a n s f e rp a r to ft h eb e n e ﬁts to the consumers,
it faces a problem. Any increase in (proﬁtable) investment will be self de-
feating, unless market proﬁtability is so high to more than compensate proﬁt
sharing. Therefore, the ﬁrm waits until market conditions are substantially
more favorable, and investment is delayed and possibly never carried out.
T h i sp a p e ri sl i n k e dt ot w os t r e a m so fl i t e r a t u r e .T h eﬁrst one is the tra-
ditional theory of investment under regulation, where investment (”eﬀort”)
is fully reversible and is modelled in a static framework where the ﬁrm per-
fectly knows the return from its investment (e.g., Laﬀont and Tirole, 1986).
The same approach was taken by several papers which analyze the debate
on price cap and proﬁt sharing rules. In general this literature claims that a
pure RPI −x system is preferable to a price cap with proﬁt sharing, on the
ground of technical eﬃciency (e.g., Lyon, 1996). Weisman (1993) shows that
when price cap rules incorporate an element of proﬁt sharing, price caps may
represent a worsening relative to a pure cost based regulation, a notoriously
ineﬃcient set-up.
These models are perfectly suitable to tackle reversible investment. When
irreversibility matters, however, the decision to invest should consider the
option value of investment. As an irreversible choice entails giving up an
opportunity, the value of waiting should be considered. Introducing these
elements in the model necessarily requires one to analyze a dynamic model
(where the timing of investment can be modelled) and to explicitly consider
uncertainty, so that waiting is valuable as the information available to the
ﬁrm changes over time. This change in viewpoint is also reﬂe c t e di nt h e
4This is an application of the “bad news principle” (Bernanke, 1983), which indicates
that, under investment irreversibility, uncertainty acts asymmetrically since only the un-
favorable events aﬀect the current propensity to invest. If, thus, proﬁt sharing (i.e., the
change in the x factor) occurs only in the good state, investment decisions are not aﬀected.
3result, which is considerably less negative for proﬁt sharing, which interferes
with investment decisions only under certain conditions. Notice that this is
in line with several empirical analyses, which point out that the supposed
superiority of pure price cap schemes in providing incentives to investment
is not based on any clear empirical evidence5.
The second stream of literature is the one on investment and irreversibil-
ity. In that framework (see e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) the case of un-
regulated ﬁrms is widely considered, while less attention has been paid to
ﬁrms who are constrained in their pricing decisions. A notable exception is
Dixit (1991), who studies the eﬀects of price ceilings in a competitive indus-
try. In particular, he shows that the price ceiling aﬀects one-oﬀ investment
strategies only if it low enough. Although consistent with our result, Dixit’s
ﬁnding does not refer to a monopoly and especially it does not include an
earnings sharing clause in the price constraint.
The next section introduces the basic continuous time model. Section 3
analyses the eﬀects of regulation with an investment of given size. Section
4, by introducing the possibility to expand the initial investment, considers
an investment of endogenous size, and contains our main result. Section 5
summarizes the results and discusses their implications.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section we present a continuous time model of investment for a ﬁrm,
subject to a regulatory constraint on its price. The ﬁrm has both an op-
tion to delay initial investment and an option to expand it. The following
assumptions hold:
1. Market demand q(t) follows a geometric Brownian motion
dq(t)=αqq(t)dt + σqq(t)dz(t)( 1 )
where t is time, αq and σq are the (constant) growth rate and variance
parameter, respectively and dz(t) is the increment of a standard Wiener
process satisfying the conditions that E(dz)=0a n dE(dz2)=dt.
2. Only one ﬁrm operates in this market. Its payoﬀ is
Π(t)=Ψ(K(t))p(t)q(t) ≡ Ψ(K(t))Θ(t)( 2 )
5For instance, Ai and Sappington (2002) show extremely mixed results.
4where p(t) is the regulated price, net of costs and Ψ(K(t)) describes
the eﬀects of capital accumulation on the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. This term
can be thought of as a mark up. According to the above assumption,
investment can be cost-reducing (namely it can lead to an increase in
the ﬁrm’s mark up).
3. Ψ(0) = 0; ΨK > 0; ΨKK > 0i fa n do n l yi fK ∈ [0,K∗]; ΨKK < 0
thereafter.
Assumption 3 has a Marshallian ﬂa v o r ,a si ta s s u m e st h ee x i s t e n c eo f
increasing returns when K does not exceed K∗. When, instead, K ≥ K∗,
capacity expansion is subject to diminishing marginal returns. In this case,
Dixit (1995) shows that there exists an optimal starting level of capital,
say K:i ft h eﬁrm decides to invest, it will never invest less than K.T h i s
level is characterized by ΨK(K)=
Ψ(K)
K and ΨKK(K) < 0; this implies that
K >K ∗. Once the start-up decision is made, investment decisions follow an
incremental strategy6.
Let us next turn to the regulatory schemes. The basic one is an RPI −x
scheme, whereby price follows a pre-set dynamics given by the x factor. If
the ﬁrm starts producing at time zero, the initial price p0 > 0i sg i v e n ,a n d
its dynamics are deﬁned by the diﬀerence between the inﬂation rate (changes
in the retail price index, RPI) and an exogenous factor xl :
p(t)=p0e
(RPI−xl)t (3)
When proﬁt sharing is introduced to complement the basic price cap formula,
this entails an upper bound to the proﬁtl e v e l ,˜ Π,a f t e rw h i c hah i g h e rx factor
applies7.P r o ﬁt sharing is therefore deﬁned as a modiﬁcation of (3), as follows
p(t)=p0e
(RPI−xj)t where xj =
½
xl if Π[K(t),Θ(t)] < ˜ Π
xh if Π[K(t),Θ(t)] > ˜ Π
(4)
with xl <x h. These parameters are known in advance by all market partici-
pants, and they are set irreversibly.
6It is worth noting that the quality of our results would not change if we assumed that
the start-up level of capital were given exogenously. In this case, if K were such that
ΨK(K) >
Ψ(K)
K ,t h eﬁrm would anyway choose a higher level of K (such that ΨK(K)=
Ψ(K)
K ). The only relevant case would be one in which ΨK(K) <
Ψ(K)
K .
7There are other possibilities to model proﬁt sharing; see Sappington and Weisman
(1996) and Schmalensee (1979) for (qualitatively analogous) formulations.
5Given (2) and (4), for any value of K(t) there exists an upper value
˜ Θ(K(t)) beyond which the regulator switches from xl to xh. To compute the
switch level, set
Ψ(K(t))Θ(t)=˜ Π
and solve for Θ(K(t)), so as to obtain the switch level ˜ Θ(K(t)) =
˜ Π
Ψ(K(t)). It
is easy to ascertain that by assumption 3
d˜ Θ(K(t))
dK(t) < 0f o ra l lK(t).
In order to determine the dynamics of proﬁt, we need to compute the
risk-adjusted rate of return or the net “cost of carry” (r − δ), where r is the
risk-free interest rate and δ is the dividend rate8. If the shareholders are
risk-neutral, under equilibrium the equality r − δ = α ≥ 0h o l d s 9.
Given the above equality, we have r − δ = RPI − xj + αq, with j = l,h.
Solving for the dividend rate we thus obtain
δ(xj)=r − RPI + xj − αq,w i t hj = l,h. (5)
Using equations (1), (2) and (3), and applying Itˆ o’s lemma we can obtain
the proﬁts’ dynamics
dΠ(t)=ΨK(K(t))Θ(t)dK + Ψ(K(t))dΘ(t)( 6 )
= Γ(K(t))Π(t)dK + Π(t)[αjdt + σdz(t)], with j = l,h.
where αj ≡ RPI −xj +αq is the expected growth rate of per-period proﬁts,
σ = σq is the standard deviation, and Γ(K(t)) ≡ ΨK(K(t)/Ψ(K(t)) > 0
captures the direct eﬀect of investment. From (6), we can see that invest-
ment aﬀects the level of proﬁt through its eﬀect on the marginal product of
capital which depends on the initial stock of capital. In particular if no new
investments are undertaken, dK =0p r o ﬁts and are driven only by exogenous
shocks.
Let us now use these results in the two cases we consider. For simplicity,
hereafter, we will omit the time variable t.
8N o t i c et h a tt h ed i v i d e n dr a t em u s tb ep o s i t i v ef o rt h en e tv a l u eo ft h eﬁrm to have
an upper bound.
9If shareholder are risk-averse, the diﬀerence r−δ takes account of a the risk premium.
However, the quality of results is unaﬀected. For further details see McDonald and Siegel
(1986).
63 The start-up decision
Let us ﬁrst analyze the start-up decision. Given Assumption 3, K is given by
technological conditions. We therefore concentrate on proﬁt maximization
given this level of capital.
It is known from investment theory that investment will take place if
current proﬁt goes beyond a certain ”trigger” level. If e Π is below this trigger
point, the price scheme would start with xj = xh.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ex factor
would remain constant, exactly like in pure price cap case. Therefore, to
have a real alternative to price cap, we must assume that e Π is greater than
the trigger point; in this way, regulation starts with a value of xj = xl,w h i c h
is made more stringent at a later stage, in case proﬁtg o e sb e y o n de Π.
Given (2) we can express this trigger point in terms of Θ.A st h e r ea r et w o
logical steps (start-up (S) and expansion(E)) we can think of the optimal







S(K)f o r K = K
Θ∗
E(K)f o r K>K
(7)
Let us start characterizing the start-up decision, i.e. Θ∗
S(K). The ﬁrm
decides whether and when to start the project of dimension K,b ys o l v i n g
a standard optimal stopping time problem. In other words, it chooses the





[V (K,Θ(T)) − pKK]e
−rT | Θ0 = Θ
ª
(8)
where E0 {·} denotes the expectation operator with the information available
at time zero, V (·) is the project value, i.e. the NPV of the project at time T,
and pK is the price of capital. Thus, O(·) represents the value of the option
to delay the start-up decision.
Given the above assumptions, therefore, one obtains the following












The optimal time of investments will be deﬁned as T∗ =i n f ( t>0 | Θ =
Θ∗
S(K)). Proposition 1 shows that the optimal start-up threshold depends
only on the factor xl. In particular, Θ∗
S(K) does not depend on the switch
point ˜ Π:a s p r o ﬁt sharing does not aﬀect the start-up decision, the neutrality
result found in Panteghini and Scarpa (2003a) is conﬁrmed. Proposition 1
also shows that this threshold depends on the average productivity of capital,
Ψ(K)
K .
4 The option to expand: proﬁts h a r i n ga n d
the size of investment
In order to analyze how regulatory constraints aﬀect how much a ﬁrm invests,
we assume that once the ﬁrm decides to make an initial investment, it has the
possibility to invest further. Again, subsequent expansions will be decided if
a n dw h e nt h ec u r r e n tp r o ﬁt level reaches diﬀerent thresholds.
These expansions are assumed to be irreversible. Technically, this means
that, by exercising the option to delay, the ﬁrm acquires a compound option
to expand, which consists of a continuum of American call options, each
for any dK. For any given starting value of capital the ﬁrm can exercise a
call option to expand production. After the exercise of such an option the
ﬁrm obtains another American call option allowing it to undertake a further
increment.
In most real-world settings, the ability to expand capacity is limited. In
particular, ﬁrms operating in regulated markets face both institutional and
technological limits, which prevent their production to go beyond a maximum
level10. Therefore, we assume that a maximum quantity of capital K exists.
The compound option is completely exercised when the ﬁrm reaches this
level.
The ﬁrst thing to check is whether the trigger point Θ∗
S(K) depends on
this possibility to expand the initial investment. To see whether this is the











10For a discussion on limited expandability, see Dixit and Pindyck (2000).
8According to (10), the ﬁrm will make the initial investment when the present
v a l u eo ft h ep r o j e c ta te n t r y ,
Ψ(K)Θ∗
S(K)
δ(xl) , equals the cost of the investment
pKK multiplied by a coeﬃcient
β1
β1−1 > 1. This coeﬃcient accounts for the
option value eﬀect: by waiting a little, the ﬁrm obtains new information
about market proﬁtability, and this reduces its downside risk. When the
ﬁrm makes the initial investment, the ﬁrm exercises an option to delay and
therefore loses some ﬂexibility. The cost of the net loss of ﬂexibility (i.e. the




When after the start up the ﬁrm may expand its capital, the start-up in-
vestment has two eﬀects. On the one hand, it reduces the ﬁrm’s ﬂexibility
(as above), but on the other hand it entails the acquisition of an option to
expand production. In this case, it is straightforward to show the following
Corollary 1 The net loss of ﬂexibility for the ﬁrm is the same, whether or
not one considers an option to expand.
Proof. See Appendix.
The reason is that what matters is the diﬀerence between the value of
the option to delay and the value of the option to expand. If there is no
possibility to expand the initial project, the value of the latter is obviously
zero. If the possibility to expand the project exists, the value of the option
to expand is positive, but the value of the option to delay increases by an
equal amount.
We can now study the ﬁrm’s investment strategies after the start-up. To
this end, the following Lemma is necessary.






Determining how much capital the ﬁrm decides to accumulate and the
timing of this process allows us to determine how the ﬁrm’s investment de-
cisions are linked to the regulatory scheme. After the initial start-up deci-
sion, investment size becomes endogenous. The following Proposition can be
proven:










If ˜ K ∈ (K,K], the candidate policy for optimal investment is described by


















ΨK(K), for K ∈ ( ˜ K,K].
(13)
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Proposition 2, as long as K<˜ K,p r o ﬁt sharing (namely
xh)d o e sn o ta ﬀect investment. Only when K ≥ ˜ K does proﬁt sharing aﬀect
capital accumulation.
With a pure price cap scheme, Θ∗(K)=Θ∗
PC(K) for any value of K
(namely, we do not have a threshold value ˜ K). With proﬁt sharing, if ˜ K ∈
(K,K] the function has two parts; the ﬁrst one coincides with Θ∗
PC(K), while
t h es e c o n do n ed i ﬀers. As shown in the Appendix (see (34)), for K ≥ ˜ K we
have Θ∗(K) > e Θ(K). In this case, the proﬁt sharing constraint is binding
and the relevant trigger point is Θ∗
PS(K). By Lemma 1, it is straightforward
to show that under proﬁt sharing, Θ∗
PS(K) > Θ∗
PC(K) for any given K ≥ ˜ K.
This means that proﬁt sharing increases the threshold value, beyond which
the ﬁrm decides to expand its plant, and thus discourages further investment.
Corollary 2 Θ∗
PC(K)=Θ∗
S(K) as long as ΨK(K)=
Ψ(K)
K .




S(K) characterizes optimal investment policy even when
we consider the option to expand. The investment function Θ∗(K)i st h e r e -
fore continuous for K = K. If we compare (9) with (13), given assumption
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Figure 1 In other words, the trigger point for the start-up decision is equal to the
trigger point above which investing K + dK is proﬁtable. This implies that
there do not exist jumps in the trigger point11.
The optimal investment policy can be represented in Figure 1 above,
which depicts Θ∗ as a function of K.
The proﬁt sharing threshold e Θ(K) is a decreasing function of K:i ti s
like an iso-proﬁt curve, where a high value of Θ must be compensated by a
low value of K.S i n c eΨK(K) is decreasing in the region (K,K], the optimal
investment policy Θ∗(K) is instead upward-sloping. When Θ∗(K)=e Θ(K),
the proﬁt sharing constraint intervenes, xj jumps from xl to xh and therefore
Θ∗(K) has a discontinuity (see (13)). This happens for K = e K,w h i c hi sb y
assumption larger than K.
When Θ < Θ∗
PC(K), the optimal policy is inaction (keeping K constant).
The ﬁrm waits until the stochastic process moves Θ above Θ∗
PC(K), and at
this point it will be optimal to invest (to increase K). When Θ∗
PC(K) <
Θ < Θ∗
PC( e K), a discrete investment will occur in a lump, to move the capital
level immediately to the optimal policy curve, as long as the proﬁt sharing
constraint is not binding (i.e., as long as K ≤ e K). When Θ∗
PC( e K) < Θ <
Θ∗
PS( e K)t h eﬁrm cannot increase capital beyond the level e K: further in-
vestments would push the ﬁrm beyond the threshold where proﬁt sharing
intervenes, and would thus tighten the regulatory constraint.
The ﬁrm will increase its capital level beyond e K only when Θ > Θ∗
PS( e K).
At such high levels of revenue, the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to accept a tightening
of the price rule: forgiving market opportunities would be too expensive.
When K reaches its maximum level K, further investments are impossible
and the ﬁrm can only produce at the regulated price.
We therefore see that proﬁt sharing is neutral for low levels of investment
(K<e K) and in particular for the start up decision. Moreover, proﬁt sharing
is neutral if it intervenes for large enough levels of proﬁt( s u c ht h a t e K>
11If we had assumed that the start-up level of capital were given exogenously, as already
pointed out, K would be such that ΨK(K) <
Ψ(K)
K . Therefore, an exogenous jump would
take place after the start-up, i.e. Θ∗
S(K) < Θ∗
PC(K + dK). However, the Θ∗ schedule
would not change for K>K , and the qualitative nature of the result would not change.
11K), while it is distortionary otherwise, delaying - possibly, for an indeﬁnite
amount of time - large increments of the initial investment.
Let us now analyze the eﬀect of these regulatory schemes on the ﬁrm’s
value. It is straightforward to show that






























The ﬁrm’s value consists of the sum of the static net present value (
Π(K,Θ)
δ(xl) )
and the option values (A1(K,xl)Θβ1(xl)). The ﬁr s tp a r to fA1(K,xl)m e a s u r e s
the value of the option to expand under pure price cap, and indeed it only
depends on xl. The second term is the expected loss (given that δ(xl) <
δ(xh)) due to a tighter regulation, which intervenes as Θ reaches the threshold
e Θ(K). The formula shows that this loss is proportional to the expected value
of the incremental investments which are delayed by the ﬁrm because of proﬁt
sharing.
This means that the value of the ﬁrm is negatively aﬀected by proﬁt
sharing, relative to a pure price cap. To some extent, this is desirable: the
very notion of proﬁt sharing comes from the idea that a scheme which yields
an excessively imbalanced distribution of rents is undesirable12.T h u s ,o n eo f
the regulators’ main targets is the rent extraction per se, with as little distor-
tion as possible. However, unlike Panteghini and Scarpa (2003a), here total
investment size is endogenous, and proﬁt sharing may generate a distortion
in investment decisions and therefore an ineﬃciency. A more complete wel-
fare evaluation of this would require a full speciﬁcation of a welfare function,
which is beyond the scope of the paper.
12Note that also the rate-of-return regulation scheme, still prevailing in a large part of
the US, is based on the idea that restraining monopoly rents is a goal by itself.
125 Extensions and conclusion
Despite its apparent complexity, necessary to incorporate uncertainty and
time in a satisfactory way, the model still lies on certain assumptions. How-
ever, it is easy to show how the model can accommodate at least two addi-
tional factors.
Regulatory risk. We have explicitly modeled market uncertainty, while
regulatory risk - the possibility that the regulator committed to a price cap
mechanism betrays expectations and changes the x factor because observed
proﬁts are very high - raises diﬀerent issues. If revenues may be revised
downwards because proﬁts are “too high”, then ﬁrm’s choices will be aﬀected.
But does the introduction of earnings sharing provisions change? Panteghini
and Scarpa (2003b) tackle this issue with an investment of given size, showing
how uncertainty which intervenes in good states of the world (the risk that
high proﬁts will partially be shared) does not aﬀect investment decisions.
In the framework we analyze here, it would be easy to show that the same
conclusion applies to the initial (start-up) investment. However, regulatory
risk may aﬀect the size of total investment, and therefore the expansion
decisions. Would earnings sharing be a good way to neutralize this eﬀect?
Every decision to expand the initial investment is taken, looking at the future
expected value of that expansion. In that moment, the logic governing the
decision is the same which underlies the start-up. Therefore, regulatory risk
linked to high proﬁts does not modify the comparison between proﬁt sharing
and pure price cap that we have developed in the previous section.
Two-sided proﬁts h a r i n g .Many schemes with proﬁt sharing do not
only intervene when proﬁts are too high, but when proﬁts are low as well.
In this way, the x factor could be adjusted downwards if demand or cost
conditions worsen13 and proﬁts fall below a given threshold. This provides
the ﬁrm a form of insurance against market risks and - relative to a pure price
cap scheme - this gives the ﬁrm an additional incentive to invest14.T h e r e f o r e ,
Proposition 1 would be modiﬁed in that a two-sided earning sharing scheme
encourages the ﬁrm to invest sooner than with a pure price cap. Expansion
investments would equally be encouraged, so that the underinvestment result
13Weisman (2002) stresses how important it would be to distinguish between these
sources of low proﬁtability. We agree with his point, which is anyway beyond the scope of
these remarks.
14A provision of this type would make “bad news” less “bad” and is therefore not neutral
to investment decisions.
13of Proposition 2 should be qualiﬁed: proﬁt sharing leads to underinvestment
(in the sense of Proposition 2) if it is one-sided, while the analysis with
two-sided proﬁt sharing would lead to a more ambiguous result.
The empirical analyses of the eﬀects of earnings sharing schemes on in-
vestments lead to ambiguous conclusions, and our results indicate good rea-
sons why that may be so. However, there is room for further research. In
particular some of the parameters of this model, such as the values of x fac-
tors and of the thresholds for proﬁt sharing, are set by the regulator. Thus
an explicit framework taking into account the determination of these values
would represent a valuable extension.
146 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Using dynamic programming, the ﬁrm’s value V (K,Θ) can be written as
V (K,Θ)=Π(K,Θ)dt + e
−rdtE0 [V (K,Θ + dΘ)]
Expanding the right-hand side and using Itˆ o’s lemma one obtains




2VΘΘ (K,Θ)( 1 4 )
where VΘ (K,Θ)=∂V (K,Θ)/∂Θ and VΘΘ (K,Θ)=∂2V (K,Θ)/∂Θ2,r e -








βi(xl),( 1 5 )




β(β − 1) + (r − δ(xl))β − r =0 .
To compute the value function, we use the boundary condition V (K,0) =
0. Namely, when Θ goes to zero, the value function becomes worthless16 This
implies that A2(K,x l)=0 . Notice that starting with the initial capacity K,
at each instant t the ﬁrm has two possibilities: it may decide to add capital,
or it can decide not to make further investment. Installing an additional
unit of capital dK entails the exercise of an option to expand. The value of

















It is easy to ascertain that
∂β1(x)
∂x > 0.
16For further details on the boundary conditions see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch. 5
and 6).
15term A1(K,x l)Θβ1(xl) is the sum of the marginal options to increase, allowing
the accumulation from the current amount of capital K.
Let’s now turn to the option value O(K,Θ). As in (8), we can write
O(K,Θ)=e
−rdtE0 [O(K,Θ + dΘ)]






As mentioned above, the initial regulatory regime is the pure price cap
(with proﬁt sharing possibly intervening only at a later stage). Thus, Bi(K,x l)




where B1(K,x l) is a constant to be determined. The optimal investment
timing can be computed using the Value Matching Condition (VMC) and
the Smooth Pasting Condition (SPC). The former condition requires the
net present value of the project to be equal to the option value to defer
investment, namely
V (K,Θ
∗) − pKK = O(K,Θ
∗). (VMC)
The second condition requires the slopes of the functions [V (K,Θ) − pKK]




Conditions VMCand SPC characterize optimal investment time. Given
(6), this value can be associated to a level Θ∗(K): whenever current proﬁt
reaches Π(K,Θ∗(K,)), the ﬁrm invests. To solve the optimal stopping time
problem, let us substitute (15) and (16) into the VMC and the SPC.W e
thus obtain a two-equation system with two unknowns: the trigger point of










,( 1 7 )
16and the diﬀerence







Term [B1(K,x l) − A1(K,x l)]Θβ1(xl) measures the value of the option to
delay, net of the option to expand. By undertaking the initial investment the
ﬁrm gets an option to expand production. When the ﬁrm starts production,
i.e. at Θ∗
S(K), the net loss of ﬂexibility is
pKK
β1(xl)−1.¥
6.2 Proof of Corollary 1











If now we assume that the ﬁrm does not have any option to expand, then








which implies that the net loss of ﬂexibility is the same whether or not the
option to expand exists.¥
6.3 Proof of Lemma 1

































σ2 > 0. (21)





















































































































































It is easy to ascertain that
lim














´ > 0, for δ(xj) ∈ (0,r]. (23)
Let us next recall equation (5):
δ(xj)=r − RPI + xj − αq.
Obviously,
∂δ(xj)










This proves Lemma 1.¥
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
To show that system (13) provides the optimal triggers for the incremental
decision, let us ﬁrst deﬁne the ﬁrm’s value at time zero. This is the expected
discounted stream of proﬁts Π(K,Θ) ≡ Ψ(K)Θ, taking into account both
proﬁt sharing regulation as well as the value of K. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that Π ≤ ˜ Π.T h eﬁrm’s problem is






−rt[Π(K,Θ) − pKdK]dt | K0 = K, Θ0 = Θ
¸
(24)
such that dK ≥ 0,K≤ K and (6) for all t. Absent installation costs, the rate
of growth of capital is unbounded where dK is the investment process. The
expectation in equation (24) is taken with respect to the joint distribution
of K and Θ, with Θ driven by (6), conditional on the information available
at time zero and taking into account the proﬁt sharing constraint and the
irreversibility constraint.
Assuming that V is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, a solution can be
obtained starting within a time interval where no new investment occurs.
From (24), the ﬁrm’s value can be written as
19V (K,Θ)=Π(K,Θ)dt + e
−rdtE0 [V (K,Θ + dΘ)],
Expanding the right-hand side and using Itˆ o’s lemma one obtains




2VΘΘ (K,Θ)( 2 5 )
Diﬀerentiating (25) with respect to K, and deﬁning by v(K,Θ) ≡ VK (K,Θ)
the contribution of the Kth unit of capital to the ﬁrm’s value, we obtain the
following diﬀerential equation




2vΘΘ (K,Θ)( 2 6 )






The index l in ai(K,xl) indicates that x = xl, i.e. that proﬁt sharing is
not in place. The interpretation of equation (27) is then transparent. The
contribution of the Kth unit of capital to the proﬁt ﬂow, when the existing
stock of capital is K, is given by ΠK (K,Θ)=ΨK(K)Θ. Since Θ is expected
to grow at the rate αl until the proﬁt sharing threshold ˜ Π is reached, and at


























−rtΠK (K,Θ;αl)dt + e






−rtΠK (K,Θ;αl)dt + e













20where T indicates the ﬁrst value of t such that Θ reaches the trigger ˜ Θ.







As usual (28) and (29) are the VMC and SPC for the ﬁrm’s optimal policy.
Moreover, (30) imposes the irreversibility constraint on capital dK ≥ 017.
The last condition (31) imposes that K ≤ K.






























Since ΨK(K) is decreasing in K, this identiﬁes an upward-sloping curve.


















Finally, we need to show that the investment policy (32) is viable and
optimal at ˜ Π. O nt h el a t t e rp o i n t ,i tm u s tb et h a te Θ and Θ∗ coincide when
the constraint is binding. Now, deﬁne ˜ K as the largest K ≤ K that satisﬁes










∗( ˜ K). (34)
17In other words, when Θ is very small the expected present value of the last unit of
capital installed is close to zero. Therefore, the value of the marginal option to scrap it
is almost inﬁnite. For further details on the boundary conditions see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994, Ch. 5 and 6).
21Given decreasing returns to scale, it easy to show that ˜ K exists and is unique.
Furthermore, for all K ≤ ˜ K it turns out that Θ∗(K) ≤ e Θ(K) which concludes
the ﬁrst part of the proof.
Let us now turn to the case where ˜ K ≤ K ≤ K. Notice that now it may
well happen that, for given K>˜ K, proﬁt ﬁrst goes beyond ˜ Π (i.e. Θ ≥ e Θ),
while at a later stage Π ≤ ˜ Π (i.e. Θ ≤ e Θ). In this case, in line with the
spirit of the mechanism at stake, the price cap goes back to its original level.
Recalling (24), the Bellman equations will be
rV (K,Θ)=
= Π(K,Θ)+( r − δ(xl))ΘVΘ (K,Θ)+σ2
2 Θ2VΘΘ (K,Θ)




= Π(K,Θ)+( r − δ(xh))ΘVΘ (K,Θ)+σ2
2 Θ2VΘΘ (K,Θ)
for Θ ≥ e Θ
(36)
Therefore, by the same line of reasoning, the contribution of the Kth unit of
capital to the ﬁrm’s value can be evaluated using (27)-(31) for Θ ≤ e Θ with
(32) as optimal policy. On the other hand, eliminating the dependence on ˜ Π













∗)=0 ( 3 9 )
a2(K,xh)=0 ( 4 0 )
a1(K,xh)=0 ( 4 1 )




















< 0( 4 3 )
This concludes the proof.¥
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
To compute the ﬁrm’s value let us start with the interval K ≥ ˜ K.S o l v i n g









βi(xh) for Θ ≥ e Θ. (44)
In equation (44), the ﬁrst term is the expected value of proﬁt ﬂows if K is
held constant at its current level. As for the second term, A1(K,xh)Θβi(xh)
is the value of the ﬁrm’s optimal future capacity expansion in response to
the evolution of Θ towards the optimal investment policy Θ∗(K). Therefore
A1(K,xh) must be positive. On the contrary, the term A2(K,xh)Θβi(xh) is
the expected present value of returning below the Proﬁt Sharing constraint
(i.e. Θ ≤ e Θ) in the future: A2(K,xh)m u s tb ep o s i t i v ea sw e l l .








βi(xl) for Θ ≤ e Θ. (45)
T oc o m p u t et h ev a l u ef u n c t i o n ,w eu s et h eb o u n d a r yc o n d i t i o nV (K,0) = 0,
which implies that A2(K,xl)=0 . The other term A1(K,xl)Θβ1(xl) represents
the consequences of reaching the proﬁt sharing constraint in the future (from
above) in case the proﬁt ﬂow is reduced. This implies that A1(K,xl)m u s t
be negative.
So far we have three constants A1(K,xh),A 2(K,xh)a n dA1(K,xl)t ob e
determined. To this end, we assume that the value function is continuously




i=1 Ai(K,xh)˜ Θ(K)βi(xh) =
=
Π(K,˜ Θ(K))





i=1 βi(xh)Ai(K,xh)(˜ Θ(K))βi(xh) =
=
Π(K,˜ Θ(K))
δ(xl) + β1(xl)A1(K,xl)(˜ Θ(K))β1(xl)
(47)
















Suppose now that K ≤ ˜ K. In this case the proﬁt sharing constraint is never
binding and for the ﬁrm’s value the only eﬀective threshold is the investment
policy Θ∗(K) ≡ Θ∗
PC(K).
For Θ ∈ (0,Θ∗(K) ≡ Θ∗








βi(xl) for Θ ≤ Θ
∗ (49)
A g a i n ,t oc o m p u t e( 4 9 )w eu s et h eb o u n d a r yc o n d i t i o nV (K,0) = 0, which
implies that A2(K,xl)=0 . Diﬀerently from (45), the term, A1(K,xl)Θβ1(xl)
represents the value of the ﬁrm’s optimal future capacity expansion, in re-
sponse to the evolution of Θ towards the optimal investment policy Θ∗(K).
Yet, diﬀerently from (44), here we should take into account the possible
switches in the state variable Θ.



























18Notice that if ˜ K = K the constraint ˜ Π disappears.
24This shows that the introduction of a proﬁt sharing threshold ˜ Π decreases
the ﬁrm’s value.
Finally, by Lemma 1, the comparison of (32) and (42) involves a change
in the optimal policy during the period of optimization, i.e. there is a discon-
tinuous jump in the optimal policy at K = ˜ K. However, we can show that
ﬁrm’s value does not display any discrete jump.
Deﬁning by (42) Θ∗
PS( ˜ K) be the state’s value immediately after the jump,
while by (32) Θ∗
PC( ˜ K) is the value before the jump, the ﬁrm waits until the
stochastic process Θ moves it vertically to Θ∗
PS( ˜ K) before adding a new unit
under the Proﬁt Sharing regulation. As the Proﬁt Sharing constraint is ex-
ogenously set by the regulator when it is not binding the optimal investment
p o l i c yi sd e t e r m i n e db ym a t c h ing and smooth pasting the ﬁrm’s value func-
tion. At the point where the constraint binds, the optimal policy is given by
an indiﬀerence condition before and after the jump in x. This requires the














which ensures that regime switches do not cause any discrete change in the
ﬁrm’s value.¥
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